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Researching the Jury’s Internet and Social
Media Presence: The Ethical and Privacy
Implications
WHITNI HART*
“‘Jurors are like icebergs – only 10 percent of them is what you see in
court . . . But you go online and sometimes you can see the rest of the juror
iceberg that’s below the water line.’”1
This Comment discusses the lack of guidelines regulating attorneys’
online research of potential and sitting jurors. Instantaneous online access
to the personal lives of jurors provides attorneys with the opportunity to exploit private information throughout the entire trial process, ranging from
voir dire to closing arguments. Because this research most often occurs outside of the courtroom doors, courts have had little opportunity to address the
issue. Very few courts and ethics committees have implemented policies related to the use of social media to investigate jurors, which leaves it up to the
attorneys in most jurisdictions to decide what is or is not acceptable conduct.
Because attorneys have a duty to act in the best interests of their clients, it is
unlikely that they will find on their own that simple online research would
violate a juror’s privacy or threaten the integrity of a trial. After providing a
summary of the limited authority from various jurisdictions regulating the
use of online research of jurors, this Comment analyzes the differences and
reconciles them by proposing uniform model guidelines for attorneys to follow.

*
Third-year law student at Northern Illinois University College of Law. I would
like to thank Professor Jeanna Hunter and Professor Jay Streitz for their encouragement and
guidance as I navigated the research and writing process of this Comment.
1. Brian Grow, Internet v. Courts: Googling for the Perfect Juror, REUTERS LEGAL
(Feb. 17, 2011, 10:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-courts-voirdire/internet-vcourts-googling-for-the-perfect-juror-idUSTRE71G4VW20110217 [https://perma.cc/T2E9WPW8].
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I. INTRODUCTION
A 2019 study revealed that 79% of Americans have at least one social
media account, which amounts to approximately 247 million users.2 Users
have indicated that the primary reasons that they create social media accounts
are to maintain relationships and to connect with others.3 It is highly unlikely
that the driving force behind the creation of social media accounts is to make
it more convenient for attorneys to locate background information about citizens in the event that they are called for jury duty. However, while “[v]etting
of potential jurors through social media is becoming more common, ‘lawyers
2. J. Clement, Share of U.S. Population with a Social Media Profile 2008-2019
(Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/273476/percentage-of-us-population-witha-social-network-profile/ [https://perma.cc/R8L8-28ND].
3. Aaron Smith, Why Americans Use Social Media, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 15,
2011), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2011/11/15/why-americans-use-social-media/
[https://perma.cc/VSV6-6KCD].
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are skittish about discussing the practice, in part because the court rules on
the subject are murky or nonexistent in most jurisdictions.’”4
Social media is defined as “all the technological means . . . that enable
people to participate in Internet content creation and online social networking.”5 Internet investigations of potential jurors, as referred to herein, primarily applies to social media as defined, but it also applies “to the use of search
engines, court databases . . . and the search for other sources of perceivable
content accessible via the internet.”6 Conducting internet research of potential jurors may be critical to an attorney’s case because social media can reveal personal information and opinions of potential jurors that would not otherwise be discoverable throughout the jury selection process.7 While this
practice is becoming more common with the advances in technology, attorneys in most jurisdictions have to guess as to how they are expected to conduct such investigations because the searches take place outside of court and
rarely cause disputes; therefore, courts thus far have had little reason to rule
on the issue.8 John Nadolenco, a Los Angeles-based attorney, acknowledged
the ambiguous guidelines, stating that “[l]awyers don’t know the rules yet.
It’s like the Wild West.”9 Furthermore, during a 2011 study of the jury selection process, ten law firms denied the researchers access to their methods of
building juror profiles, with many admitting that it was due to the fact that
they were unsure if judges would approve of their techniques.10 The inconsistent, or complete lack of, rules surrounding internet searches of potential
jurors leave too many issues open to interpretation by attorneys whose duty
it is to act in the best interests of their clients.
According to a 2014 survey of United States district judges, 73.3% of
federal judges did not know how many attorneys used the internet or social
media to conduct background investigations of potential jurors during voir
dire.11 Of all of the judges who responded to the survey, 90.6% indicated that
4. Sluss v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 215, 227 (Ky. 2012) (quoting Grow, supra
note 2).
5. Social Media, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
6. Brandon A. Fortuno, Friend Request: Ethically and Legally Investigating Jurors’
Social Media, 6 STETSON J. ADVOC. & L. 70, 71 (2019), https://www2.stetson.edu/advocacyjournal/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Fortuno_2019.pdf. [https://perma.cc/T255-BNBQ].
7. Id.
8. JOSEPH C. CRAWFORD, INTERNET AND SOCIAL MEDIA SEARCHES ABOUT
POTENTIAL AND ACTUAL JURORS DURING VOIR DIRE AND TRIAL – ETHICAL AND TRIAL
ADVOCACY ISSUES 13 (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.actl.com/docs/default-source/default-document-library/events/mar_1_2018_cle_materials_mock_pre_trial_hearing_request_to_use_social_media_searches [https://perma.cc/SXR5-T3AK].
9. Grow, supra note 2.
10. Id.
11. MEGHAN DUNN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JURORS’ AND ATTORNEYS’ USE OF SOCIAL
MEDIA DURING VOIR DIRE: A REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT
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they did not know what forms of internet or social media searches the attorneys used in order to learn more information about prospective jurors.12 Furthermore, 69.3% of the responding judges indicated that they did not even
address the issue of internet and social media searches with attorneys before
they conducted voir dire.13 This consensus is consistent with the trend
throughout the United States: Jurors, attorneys, and judges are largely unaware of the guidelines to which attorneys must adhere when conducting internet and social media research.14
The lack of regulation of a practice as common as researching potential
jurors’ online presence is dangerous for attorneys, clients, and jurors alike.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the limited authority that exists for guiding social media searches of jurors and will illustrate that the court decisions,
ethics opinions, and procedural rules that are currently in place leave significant gaps in guidelines. Part III will offer a recommendation as to how to
best reconcile the discrepancies between the various authorities and will suggest a model rule that would protect the interests of litigants, attorneys, and
jurors. Part IV will conclude the Comment.
II. HISTORY
A. AN EXAMINATION OF THE RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY

Litigants in both criminal and civil court proceedings are constitutionally entitled to trial by an impartial jury.15 The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution grants jury trial rights to criminal defendants and ensures that “[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed.”16 Similarly, the Seventh Amendment grants
ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT 12 (2014), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/Jurors-Attorneys-Social-Media-Trial-Dunn-FJC-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G4QV-VJK6]. Of the 1,021 judges who were sent the survey, 494 provided
responses. Id. at 3.
12. Id. at 13. 4.6% of judges indicated that attorneys were searching Facebook, 4.6 %
indicated that attorneys were searching Google, 2.4% indicated that attorneys were searching
LinkedIn, 2.4% indicated that attorneys were looking at personal blogs or websites, and 1.8%
indicated that attorneys were searching Twitter. Id.
13. Id. 4.9% of judges indicated that they permit attorneys to use social media during
voir dire, and 25.8% of judges indicated that they do not permit attorneys to use social media
during voir dire. DUNN, supra note 12, at 13.
14. See CRAWFORD, supra note 9; DUNN, supra note 12; STEPHEN PATTERSON,
VINSON & CO., USING SOCIAL MEDIA AND OTHER BACKGROUND RESEARCH IN VOIR DIRE: WHY
JURORS DON’T CARE BUT YOU SHOULD 1 (2016), https://vinsoncompany.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Using-Social-Media-Other-Background-Research-in-Voir-Dire.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R2QJ-3LKQ].
15. Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 164 F.3d 511, 514 (10th Cir. 1998).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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civil litigants jury trial rights by stating, “[i]n Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved.”17 While the Seventh Amendment does not contain explicit language requiring that a jury in a civil trial be impartial, that right has
been implied because, otherwise, the right to a jury trial would be a façade.18
An impartial jury is vital to any fair trial because the purpose of a jury is to
inject the common sense of the community into the trial process to protect
litigants from the intentional or unintentional biases of experienced attorneys
or judges.19
Ideally, an impartial jury means that all members are willing and able
to disregard any extraneous information or opinions they may possess and to
consider only the evidence presented during trial while deliberating the verdict.20 In order to evaluate whether jurors possess biases that would render
them impartial, attorneys or judges ask potential jurors a series of questions
while the jurors are sworn under oath, a process known as “voir dire.”21 Trial
judges in both criminal and civil cases are granted broad discretion to control
the line of questioning during voir dire, and they usually permit any questions
that are relevant to uncover biases that would influence the jurors’ determination of the case.22
If an attorney uncovers information about a juror during voir dire that is
unfavorable to her client’s case, she may excuse that juror through either a
challenge for cause or a peremptory challenge.23 Challenges for cause are
unlimited in number and are permissible when the juror possesses either inferred or actual bias.24 On the other hand, peremptory challenges are limited
in number and may be exercised, without explanation, as the attorneys desire.25 However, peremptory challenges may not be exercised in a discriminatory manner based upon protected classes, and the definition of “protected

17. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
18. Skaggs, 164 F.3d at 514.
19. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
20. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984).
21. See Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991). “Voir dire” means “to speak
the truth.” Voir Dire, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
22. Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 422. One factor that judges should consider when evaluating
the appropriateness of a question during voir dire is the claim or punishment at stake. Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 356 (E.D. Tex. 1995). For example, if the jury is determining
whether to impose the death penalty on a criminal defendant, very few questions would be
irrelevant because both parties have great interests in the outcome. Id.
23. JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, MASTERING VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELECTION 2 (4th ed.
2018).
24. Id. Inferred bias of juror is assumed by the court as a result of a juror’s personal
interest in or relationship to the case. Id. Actual bias is assigned to jurors based upon prejudicial statements made during voir dire. Id.
25. Id.
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classes” has gotten more broad in recent years.26 Because of the increasingly
restrictive rules surrounding peremptory challenges, voir dire now requires
more extensive information to ensure that challenges are not exercised for
improper reasons.27
In order to obtain the information necessary to exercise appropriate
challenges during voir dire, attorneys often engage in pretrial investigations
of jurors.28 However, the rules of professional conduct prohibit attorneys
from engaging in ex parte communication with potential jurors before, during, and generally after the court proceedings, so any inquiry into a juror must
be carried out with caution.29 In the past, attorneys traditionally gathered information through indirect means such as “researching newspapers and public archives, consulting other attorneys, conducting ‘drive-bys’ of jurors’ residences, speaking with neighbors of jurors, and following jurors throughout
the day.”30 While these methods have provided attorneys with more information than they would be privy to without a pretrial investigation, the recent
rise of social media has opened even more investigatory doors that were previously unimaginable.31 However, courts, ethics committees, and scholars
share vastly different opinions as to how attorneys should be expected to conduct such searches.32 Various courts have ruled on the issues of internet
searches, public records searches, and social media searches.
B. CASES PERMITTING INTERNET SEARCHES OF POTENTIAL JURORS, WITH
POSSIBLE RESTRICTIONS

i.

United States v. Parse

In United States v. Parse, the court was alerted to an attorney’s internet
searches of potential jurors and did not prohibit it, but the court left open the
26. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibiting the exercise of peremptory
challenges based upon race); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (prohibiting
the exercise of peremptory challenges based upon gender). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that States are permitted to experiment with different “protected classes” of jurors, despite the traditional notion that peremptory challenges were not to be subjected to judicial
review. See McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983).
27. Brandborg, 891 F. Supp. at 357.
28. Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Applying Rules of Discovery to Info. Uncovered About
Jurors, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 28, 34 (2011).
29. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.5(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). “A lawyer shall
not . . . communicate ex parte with [a prospective juror] during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court order.” Id. “Ex parte” means “for the benefit of one party only,
and without notice to, or argument by, anyone having an adverse interest.” Ex Parte, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
30. Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Investigating Jurors in the Digital Age: One Click at a
Time, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 611, 618 (2012).
31. See id. at 625.
32. See CRAWFORD, supra note 9.
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question of what the consequences would be for conducting internet searches
and failing to disclose what an attorney reasonably believes to be misconduct
by the potential juror.33 Parse and multiple others were convicted of various
fraud and tax-related offenses.34 Following the convictions, the defendant
and three co-defendants appealed, contending that they were entitled to a new
trial because Juror Conrad gave false statements and withheld information
that would have revealed her bias during voir dire.35 The motion for a new
trial stated that the defense’s investigation into Juror Conrad was prompted
by the government’s disclosure of a post-trial letter it received from Juror
Conrad, in which she praised the government’s performance during trial.36
At an evidentiary hearing to evaluate Juror Conrad’s nondisclosures, the
court found that she lied about only possessing a bachelor’s degree and that
she actually obtained a law degree and practiced law in New York, until her
license was suspended for failure to cooperate with an investigation into her
alleged misconduct.37 She also lied about prior arrests and criminal charges
of both her husband and herself.38 At the hearing, Juror Conrad admitted that
she lied in order to make herself more “marketable” as a juror.39
Parse’s counsel later admitted that they discovered the suspension order
for Juror Conrad’s law license before voir dire, but they claimed that they
took her statements to mean that she was a different person than the individual named on the order.40 Parse’s counsel conducted another search after
closing arguments and found evidence of Juror Conrad’s true identity, but
counsel claimed that they did not definitively conclude who Juror Conrad
was until after the government disclosed the letter and they matched Juror
Conrad’s phone number with a phone number listed on the New York attorney registration website.41
The trial court denied Parse’s motion for a new trial because his attorneys were either aware of the potential misconduct during trial, or failed to
act with reasonable diligence by not investigating further once they had reason to be suspicious.42 Parse appealed, and the appellate court believed that
a new trial was appropriate because Parse was denied his right to an impartial
jury since his attorneys could have reasonably believed that Juror Conrad’s
statements under oath were truthful.43 Nevertheless, the court did not reach
the question of whether Parse would have otherwise waived his right to an
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See United States v. Parse, 789 F.3d 83, 112 (2d Cir. 2015).
Id. at 85.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 88.
Parse, 789 F.3d at 89.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 95.
Parse, 789 F.3d at 95. Parse’s co-defendants were granted a new trial. Id.
Id. at 116, 118.
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impartial jury because the court found that Parse’s attorneys did not possess
knowledge of Juror Conrad’s misconduct.44 Parse illustrates the risks that
stem from engaging in pretrial research and neglecting to report suspected
juror misconduct to judges because it is unclear if Parse’s counsel’s failure
to disclose would have resulted in a waiver of Parse’s constitutional right to
an impartial jury.

ii.

Roberts ex rel. Estate of Roberts v. Tejada

In Tejada, a widow brought a medical malpractice suit against Dr.
Tejada, claiming he was negligent in the treatment of her husband’s cancer.45
During voir dire, the court and attorneys asked if any potential juror had ever
been involved in a lawsuit, and, after a defense verdict, the plaintiff’s attorney conducted a public records search and discovered that three jurors failed
to disclose their prior litigation history during voir dire.46 The Florida Supreme Court held that public records searches of potential jurors should be
permitted upon request if they can be conducted without unnecessary delay;
however, the court rejected the adoption of a bright-line rule requiring a public records search because there would be no way to implement a uniform
application of the rule.47 The court discussed the vast array of resources that
contained public records and the court’s inability to provide litigants and their
attorneys with proper means to review all possible records; therefore, the
court found it inappropriate to impose rules that would require a team of lawyers to remain in compliance.48

iii. Sluss v. Commonwealth
In Sluss v. Commonwealth, the defendant was on trial for multiple offenses stemming from his driving under the influence and striking another
vehicle, which resulted in the death of an eleven-year-old child.49 The defendant moved for a new trial due to alleged juror misconduct that resulted
from two jurors being Facebook “friends” with the victim’s mother, but the
motion was denied by the trial court.50 The defendant appealed the denial,
and the appellate court remanded the case back to the trial court to make
factual determinations as to the extent of the relationship between the jurors
and the victim’s mother.51 Although the appellate court did not decide the
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 112.
Roberts ex rel. Estate of Roberts v. Tejada, 814 So. 2d 334, 336 (2002).
Id. at 337.
Id. at 344.
Id.
Sluss v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Ky. 2012).
Id. at 221.
Id. at 229.
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ultimate issue as to whether the social media relationships at issue constituted
juror misconduct, the court did comment on the permissibility of social media
searches of prospective jurors.52 The court acknowledged that internet
searches of potential jurors are common but that “[l]awyers are skittish about
discussing the practice, in part because the court rules on the subject are
murky or nonexistent in most jurisdictions.”53 The court held that social media searches of potential jurors were permissible so long as attorneys followed the guidelines set forth by the New York County Lawyers Association’s Committee,54 which will be discussed in detail later in this Comment.
The court also stated that defense counsel was not at fault for failing to search
social media because he could have reasonably believed the jurors’ statements during voir dire, but that if a lawyer does conduct a search and finds
evidence of misconduct, he must report the misconduct to the court before
moving forward with the case.55

iv. Carino v. Muenzen
In Carino v. Muenzen, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit
against Dr. Muenzen.56 During voir dire, plaintiff’s counsel began using a
laptop to conduct internet searches of prospective jurors, and the defense objected.57 The trial court sustained the objection, stating that the lack of advance notice of the intent to conduct internet searches placed the defense at
an unfair disadvantage.58 The jury returned a defense verdict and the judge
dismissed the matter, but the plaintiff appealed, claiming, in part, that the
trial judge erred in precluding counsel from conducting internet research during voir dire.59 Despite the traditional deference given to trial judges to make
their own courtroom rules, the appellate court found that the judge in this
case acted unreasonably because plaintiff’s counsel’s laptop use was not disruptive and because the parties already had a “level playing field” since both
parties had internet access in the courtroom.60 Even so, the appellate court
denied reversal on these grounds because the plaintiff did not prove that the
trial court’s ruling caused him prejudice.61

52. Id. at 227.
53. Id. (quoting Grow, supra note 2).
54. Sluss, 381 S.W.3d at 227.
55. Id. at 228.
56. Carino v. Muenzen, No. A-5491-08T1, 2010 WL 3448071, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010).
57. Id. at *4.
58. Id.
59. Id. at *7.
60. Id. at *10.
61. Carino, 2010 WL 3448071, at *10.
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v. Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc.
In 2016, Judge William Alsup for the Northern District of California
took a unique approach to the issue of social media searches of potential jurors in the case of Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc.62 In Oracle, both attorneys to a copyright suit requested extra time between the return of the
initial juror questionnaires and beginning voir dire.63 Judge Alsup discovered
that the additional time was to permit internet searches, and he determined
that if the parties would not agree to an outright ban on those searches, they
would have to follow a set of strict guidelines.64
To begin with, Judge Alsup expressed the “reverential respect” that
judges have for juries and was troubled by the notion that juries, in addition
to the sacrifices of their service, must also tolerate the attorneys invading
their privacy on social media.65 On the other hand, Judge Alsup also recognized the fact that social media searches of potential jurors could reveal information that would allow for more effective peremptory challenges or discovery of information that was concealed by a juror during voir dire questioning.66 Nevertheless, he considered restricting social media searches altogether for three reasons.67 First, Judge Alsup believed that if jurors learned
that the attorneys were researching them online, jurors would be more inclined to conduct their own research about the attorneys and about the case.68
He thought it unfair to permit the attorneys to do to the jurors what the jurors
could not do to the attorneys, and doing so had the potential to make jurors
feel justified in conducting their own research.69 Second, the attorneys would
be more likely to make improper emotional appeals to the jury if they uncovered information about the jury’s personal preferences and opinions.70 The
court permitted “analogies and quotations” during jury arguments but drew
the line when those methods turned into a calculated personal appeal.71 Third,
Judge Alsup was concerned about the privacy rights of the potential jurors.72
62. See Sudhin Thanawala, Judge Reignites Debate Over Researching Jurors Online,
ASSOC.
PRESS
(July
16,
2016),
https://apnews.com/7be31b151b88499e948c8231cf09f151/judge-reignites-debate-over-researchingjurors-online [https://perma.cc/U6A8-AGXL].
63. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
64. Id. at 1102. The attorneys admitted to Judge Alsup that they wanted to use the
names and addresses from the juror questionnaires to investigate the background of the potential jurors on Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and other internet sites. Id. at 1101.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1102.
67. Oracle Am., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1102.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1103.
71. Id.
72. Oracle Am., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1103.
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In the court’s opinion, juror privacy should only yield when necessary to uncover bias or a failure to follow court rules, and jury selection is not meant
to be a process of constructing a “fantasy team.”73 Furthermore, the court
rejected the argument that the privacy settings on social media were a sign of
consent by the jurors to investigate because the complex nature of the privacy
settings render them “more a matter of blind faith than conscious choice.”74
While evaluating the concerns that arise when attorneys are granted access to social media profiles, Judge Alsup considered properly exercising his
discretion and imposing an absolute ban on searches; however, in order to
prevent viewers in the gallery from possessing more information than the
attorneys themselves, he instead elected to establish a procedure for the attorneys to follow if they chose to search the jurors’ social media accounts.75
To begin with, each attorney had a duty from the beginning to inform the
potential jurors of the methods they would use to investigate and monitor
online presences.76 The attorneys were prohibited from excusing their own
research by stating it was only because the other party was engaging in such
behavior, and they could not imply that the judge approved of the intrusion.77
The disclosure would place the jurors on notice that the parties would acquire
their names and addresses, as well as review their social media accounts.78
At this point, the jurors would be granted time to adjust the privacy settings
on their social media accounts.79 Because Google itself was a party to the
case, the court took extra precautions and informed the jurors that their search
histories would not be mined by either party.80
Additionally, the attorneys were required to disclose any “apparent misconduct” to the court and the opposing party, no matter who the information
benefitted.81 Both parties were required to record each search that was conducted, including the date, in order to prevent one side from falsely claiming
that they were unaware of information that later resulted in an allegation of
juror misconduct.82
According to Judge Alsup’s procedure, attorneys would be prohibited
from making personal appeals to any juror if the appeal exploited information

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Oracle Am., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1104. While explaining the reasons for the
internet and social media searches to the potential jurors, the attorneys were limited to stating
that “they [felt] obliged . . . to consider all information available to the public about candidates
to serve as jurors.” Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Oracle Am., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1104.
82. Id.
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that was obtained during internet and social media searches.83 Judge Alsup
repeatedly emphasized that he would rather protect juror privacy by prohibiting all internet and social media searches, but that he reluctantly permitted
the searches so long as they were in compliance with his guidelines.84
C.

CASES EFFECTIVELY REQUIRING INTERNET SEARCHES

i.

Johnson v. McCullough (and corresponding Missouri Civil Procedure Rule 69.025)

In Johnson v. McCullough, during voir dire in a medical malpractice
lawsuit, plaintiff’s counsel asked whether any of the potential jurors had ever
been involved in a lawsuit, and Juror Mims remained silent.85 However, after
a defense verdict, plaintiff’s counsel researched Juror Mims on Case.net and
discovered that Juror Mims was previously a defendant in multiple debt collection cases and in a personal injury case.86 The plaintiff was granted a new
trial on the grounds of juror misconduct, and the defendant appealed.87 The
court affirmed the trial court’s holding because there was no evidence that
the attorneys could have investigated the litigation history of every potential
juror.88 However, the court acknowledged modern technological advances
and established a rule for future cases that required “a party [to] use reasonable efforts to examine the litigation history on Case.net of those jurors selected but not empaneled and [to] present to the trial court any relevant information prior to trial.”89 The court intended for these guidelines to be effective until the Missouri Supreme Court enacted an applicable rule.90
In the aftermath of Johnson, the Missouri Supreme Court promulgated
the following rule, which made Missouri one of the first jurisdictions to impose a duty on attorneys to conduct internet searches of potential jurors:
69.025 Juror Nondisclosure
(a) Proposed Questions. A party seeking to inquire as to
the litigation history of potential jurors shall make
record of the proposed initial questions before voir
dire. Failure to follow this procedure shall result in
waiver of the right to inquire as to litigation history.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 554 (Mo. 2010).
Id. at 555. Case.net is “Missouri’s automated case record service.” Id.
Id.
Id. at 558.
Johnson, 306 S.W.3d at 559.
Id.
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(b) Reasonable Investigation. For purposes of this Rule
69.025, a “reasonable investigation” means review
of Case.net before the jury is sworn.
(c) Opportunity to Investigate. The court shall give all
parties an opportunity to conduct a reasonable investigation as to whether a prospective juror has
been a party to litigation.
(d) Procedure When Nondisclosure is Suspected. A
party who has reasonable grounds to believe that a
prospective juror has failed to disclose that he or she
has been a party to litigation must so inform the
court before the jury is sworn. The court shall then
question the prospective juror or jurors outside the
presence of the other prospective jurors.
(e) Waiver. A party waives the right to seek relief based
on juror nondisclosure if the party fails to do either
of the following before the jury is sworn:
(1) Conduct a reasonable investigation; or
(2) If the party has reasonable
grounds to believe a prospective
juror has failed to disclose that he
or she has been a party to litigation, inform the court of the basis
for the reasonable grounds.
(f) Post-Trial Proceedings. A party seeking post-trial
relief based on juror nondisclosure has the burden of
demonstrating compliance with Rule 69.025(d) and
Rule 69.025(e) may satisfy that burden by affidavit.
The court shall then conduct an evidentiary hearing
to determine if relief should be granted. 91
In 2017, the Missouri Court of Appeals in King v. Sorenson clarified
Rule 69.025 and held that the duty to conduct a “reasonable investigation”
was satisfied so long as the litigant conducted a Case.net search of potential
jurors using the names provided by the court, even if a name turned out to be
incorrect.92 The court also limited the scope of the duty to conduct a “reasonable investigation” of jurors’ backgrounds solely to a search of Case.net, but
acknowledged that technological advances may require the court to expand
the scope of required internet searches at some point.93 While the court attempted to clarify Rule 69.025, the petitioner in the case submitted a brief
91.
92.
93.

MO. R. CIV. P. 69.025.
King v. Sorenson, 532 S.W.3d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017).
Id. at 215.
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that highlighted the various issues that have resulted from putting the Rule
into practice.94 More specifically, petitioner acknowledged the danger of the
waiver provision under Rule 69.025 that imposes severe consequences on
those who have a duty to conduct searches of a system for purposes that the
system was not designed for.95 The waiver provision under Rule 69.025 deprives litigants of their constitutional right to an impartial jury, even if the
errors in the system are through no fault of the litigants themselves.96
ii.

Burden v. CSX Transportation, Inc.

In 2011, in the case of Burden v. CSX Transportation, Inc., the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois held that the defendant waived his objections to nondisclosures by jurors during voir dire because
the nondisclosures could have been discovered by the attorney’s exercise of
reasonable diligence prior to the verdict.97 After a verdict for the plaintiff, the
defense attorney instructed a paralegal to conduct internet searches on two
jurors that sat on the case.98 The paralegal’s investigation uncovered numerous pieces of information that the jurors failed to disclose during voir dire.99
The defense moved for a new trial on the grounds that the Seventh Amendment’s right to trial by an impartial jury was violated when the jurors failed
to disclose information that had the potential of creating bias against the defendant.100 While considering the defense’s motion for a new trial, the court
stated:
A trial represents an important investment of private and social resources, and it ill serves the important end of finality to wipe the slate clean
simply to recreate the peremptory challenge process because counsel lacked
an item of information which objectively he should have obtained from a
juror on voir dire examination.101
The court also said that “a party cannot gamble with the possibility of a
verdict and thereafter, when the verdict proves unfavorable, raise a question
he might have raised before verdict.”102 The court dismissed the motion for
a new trial because the jurors’ nondisclosures could have been revealed if the
94. See Brief for Petitioner, King v. Sorenson, 532 S.W.3d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017)
(No. 80196), 2017 WL 1374153.
95. Id. at *52.
96. Id.
97. Burden v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 08-cv-04-DRH, 2011 WL 3793664, at *9 (S.D.
Ill. Aug. 24, 2011).
98. Id. at *7.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *5.
101. Id. at *8 (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548,
550 n.2 (1984)).
102. Burden, 2011 WL 3793664, at *8 (quoting Stanczak v. Penn. R.R., 174 F.2d 43,
48-49 (7th Cir. 1949)).
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defense would have exercised reasonable diligence prior to the verdict.103
The disputed information about the jurors was all found in public documents,
with the majority of the information resulting from simple internet searches;
therefore, the information could have been discovered at an earlier time, and
the defendant gambled with the verdict and raised issues that should have
been raised earlier.104 The practical impact of this case is that trial attorneys
in the Southern District of Illinois have a duty to conduct internet searches of
potential jurors prior to the verdict in order to preserve the issue of juror nondisclosure.105
D.

CASES PROHIBITING SEARCHES

i.

United States v. Kilpatrick

In United States v. Kilpatrick, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan prohibited attorneys from using juror information that was provided by the court to conduct internet investigations of
jurors.106 In Kilpatrick, Detroit’s former mayor and other public officials
were accused of engaging in illegal behaviors, which resulted in the case attracting massive public attention.107 Therefore, the prosecution moved to empanel an anonymous jury to protect the potential jurors from unwanted publicity, to which the defense objected.108 The court elected to empanel a semianonymous jury, from which the parties would obtain the names and zip
codes of prospective jurors.109 The attorneys were prohibited from sharing
the jurors’ information, and were not allowed to engage in “any type of surveillance, investigation, or monitoring (via the internet or any other means)
using that juror information.”110 The court reasoned that voir dire provided
the parties with sufficient opportunities to investigate the jurors.111 The court
prioritized the safety and privacy of the jurors over the investigation of attorneys because jurors serve a critical function in the “democratic system of
justice” and that investigating them would “unnecessarily chill the willingness of jurors . . . to serve.”112

103. Id. at *10.
104. Id. at *9.
105. See CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 24.
106. United States v. Kilpatrick, No. 10-20403, 2012 WL 3237147, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 7, 2012).
107. Id. at *1.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Kilpatrick, 2012 WL 3237147, at *3.
112. Id.
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ETHICS OPINIONS PERMITTING SEARCHES

Very little case law exists regarding the permissibility of attorneys conducting internet and social media investigations of prospective jurors.113 As
previously stated, attorneys generally conduct searches outside of court and
the information obtained rarely causes meaningful controversy; therefore,
courts have had little reason to rule on the issue thus far.114 However, an increasing number of ethics committees are submitting suggested guidelines
for attorneys to follow if they wish to engage in online research.115 The majority of ethics opinions are concerned with Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5(b), which prohibits attorneys from “communicat[ing] ex parte with
[a prospective juror] during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law
or court order.”116 While ethics opinions are not binding, they are instructive
as to how attorneys may engage in certain activities and still remain compliant with ethical standards of conduct.117
i. American Bar Association (ABA) Formal Opinion 466
In 2014, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
released a formal opinion on the subject of lawyers’ research of jurors’ internet presence.118 At the time of the opinion, the Committee considered social
media platforms such as Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, and Twitter.119 “The
line is increasingly blurred” between an attorney’s proper investigation of a
juror and his improper communication with the juror.120 For this reason, the
Committee suggests judges and attorneys discuss the rules of internet
searches with one another, as well as advise jurors that their backgrounds
may be investigated throughout the trial process.121
More specifically, the Committee deems it permissible to engage in a
“passive review” of a juror’s online presence, so long as the attorney does
not send any form of an access request to the juror’s social media account.122
On certain websites, the juror may receive an automated notification from

113. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
114. CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 13.
115. See Oracle Am., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1107.
116. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.5(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
117. Ethics Opinions, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/ [https://perma.cc/9BBH-PZSQ].
118. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 466 (2014).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 466 (2014). The Committee
compared a “passive review” to an attorney driving past the juror’s home and using his observations to benefit his jury selection decisions. Id.
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the website itself when a person views his profile.123 However, the Committee views this notification as “beyond the control of the reviewer” because
the website sends the information independently; therefore, an attorney is allowed to view a juror’s webpage that sends automated notifications of the
review, even if the juror will know that the attorney was the one behind it.124
While the Committee approves of this behavior, it does recommend that the
attorneys be aware of the subscriber-notification and that the attorney be familiar with the technology.125 Additionally, the attorneys are not allowed to
engage in activity that is solely designed to “embarrass, delay, or burden a
third person,” so internet research that results in automated notifications must
serve some legitimate purpose.126
If an internet search reveals possible juror misconduct that is criminal
or fraudulent, Model Rule 3.3(b) requires that the lawyer take remedial
measures, which in some cases may require disclosing the information to the
court.127 However, the Rules have yet to address the duties of attorneys who
discover juror misconduct that falls short of criminal or fraudulent conduct.128 The Committee avoided filling in that gap because its role is not to
determine questions of law, but it did suggest that the law may impose a duty
on attorneys to reveal to the court juror misconduct that falls short of being
criminal or fraudulent if it violates court instructions.129
Following the publication of ABA Formal Opinion 466, bar associations in Washington D.C., Pennsylvania, and Colorado adopted the same
guidelines for attorneys who wish to conduct investigations of a potential
juror’s online presence.130
ii. New York County Lawyer’s Association Formal Opinion 743
In 2011, the New York County Lawyer’s Association Committee released a formal opinion addressing the permissibility of attorneys conducting
internet and social media research during trial.131 The Committee deemed it
123. Id. One example of such a website is LinkedIn. Who’s Viewed Your Profile –
Privacy Settings, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/47992/who-sviewed-your-profile-privacy-settings?lang=en [https://perma.cc/HJS6-R9XG].
124. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof. Resp., Formal Op. 466 (2014). The Committee
compared the automated notifications to “a neighbor’s recognizing a lawyer’s car driving
down the juror’s street and telling the juror that the lawyer had been seen driving down the
street.” Id.
125. Id. The Rules deem it important for attorneys to stay current with technology.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012).
126. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
127. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
128. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 466 (2014).
129. Id.
130. Colorado Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 127 (2015); D.C. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 371
(2016); Pennsylvania Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014).
131. New York County Lawyer’s Ass’n, Formal Op. 743 (2011).
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ethical under its version of Model Rule 3.5 for attorneys to conduct investigations of jurors’ online presence, so long as the attorney does not communicate with them in any way.132 The Committee stated, “[i]f a juror becomes
aware of an attorney’s efforts to see the juror’s profiles on websites, the contact may well consist of an impermissible communication, as it might tend to
influence the juror’s conduct with respect to the trial.”133 The Committee took
a different approach to the automated notification feature of social media
websites than the ABA, which concluded that an automated notification to
the juror of an attorney’s review of the social media profile did not constitute
an impermissible communication under Rule 3.5.134 Furthermore, the attorney must “promptly notify the court” of any juror misconduct that is discovered during the investigation.135
iii. New York City Bar Association Formal Opinion 2012-2
In 2012, the New York City Bar Association released an opinion discussing the ethical implications of attorneys conducting internet research of
potential jurors and concluded that such research is permissible.136 The Committee determined that if an attorney engages in online investigations that she
knew would result in a juror receiving a message or notification, the communication certainly violates Rule 3.5.137 However, the Committee decided that
if an attorney is unaware that her investigations will result in a message or
notification to the juror, the conduct could possibly, but not automatically,
violate Rule 3.5.138 The Committee analyzed the definition of “communication” to arrive at the conclusion that an inadvertent message or notification
might be a violation.139 Rule 3.5 does not include a mens rea requirement;
therefore, the literal interpretation of the language of the Rule would lead to
the conclusion that any communication with a juror, intentional or not, is a
violation.140 The Committee defined communication as the “‘transmission
of,’ ‘exchange of’ or ‘process of bringing’ information or ideas from one
person to another.”141 According to this definition, an unintentional notification or message that is sent to a juror may still constitute a communication
because the attorney “imparted to the person being researched the knowledge
that he or she is being investigated.”142 Moreover, the Committee advised
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
New York City Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2012-2 (2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
New York City Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2012-2 (2012).
Id.
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attorneys to only view information that potential jurors intended to make
public because reading public postings on social media is similar to reading
newspaper articles that were authored by potential jurors.143 According to the
Committee, any misconduct that an attorney discovers must be disclosed to
the court, regardless of the nature of the information.144
III.

RECOMMENDATION

As technology in the United States advances, internet and social media
searches of potential jurors are becoming common practice, but they are inconsistently regulated. The inconsistent, or complete lack of, rules and procedures governing the research of potential jurors leave the issues largely
open to the interpretation of attorneys who have ethical duties to act only in
their clients’ best interests. A practice so widely utilized is most often regulated by the zealous lawyers who are themselves engaging in the research,
which may lead to the clouding of their ethical judgments. While the practice
of conducting internet and social media searches should remain permissible,
it is critical to the integrity of the judicial system that the conduct be standardized and carried out in a manner that does not interfere with the jurors’
impartial decision-making. While individual judges enjoy the right to structure voir dire as they see fit,145 this Comment will suggest a model rule for
courts to consider when determining the permissibility and procedures for
attorneys conducting online research.
The benefits of conducting internet and social media searches of potential jurors are undeniable. Critical information that would not otherwise be
uncovered during voir dire may be discovered during online research and
help attorneys better exercise peremptory challenges.146 Possessing additional information about a juror’s online presence allows an attorney to engage in jury selection with more confidence, which eliminates the need to
make such important decisions with merely a “gut feeling.”147 The additional
information helps attorneys avoid engaging in Batson violations because they
have the knowledge necessary to exercise peremptory challenges constitutionally.148 Moreover, jurors may be more inclined to be truthful during voir
dire questioning if they know that attorneys may research their online presence and verify certain responses.149
143. Id.
144. Id. For example, an attorney may not withhold juror misconduct because the information benefits his client. Id.
145. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010).
146. CRAWFORD, supra note 9.
147. Mark O’Mara & Shawn Vincent, Social Media Jury Investigations Weed Out
Stealth Jurors, NAT’L TRIAL LAWS. (June 26, 2014), https://www.thenationaltriallawyers.org/2014/06/social-media-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/L6WJ-ALK5].
148. Hoffmeister, supra note 29.
149. Id. at 35.
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On the other hand, internet and social media searches of potential jurors
also raise significant privacy concerns. Some authorities have acknowledged
that the critical role that jurors play in the democratic process may be chilled
if the jurors feel as if they are under investigation.150 Additionally, being confronted with potentially intimate information during voir dire may make a
juror feel violated and defensive, which may result in a bias against the questioning attorney.151
A. PERMISSIBILITY OF SEARCHES

While both pros and cons stem from conducting online research of potential jurors, the benefits substantially outweigh the disadvantages. It is
proper for courts to permit internet and social media searches, but there is an
obvious need for regulation. The lack of case law on the subject demonstrates
that in most jurisdictions across the United States, online research of potential
jurors is a task that attorneys undertake with little to no supervision.
As a general rule, attorneys should be permitted to conduct online research of potential jurors. As the Oracle court acknowledged, it would be
counterintuitive to force attorneys to shield themselves from jurors’ online
presence and know less information about the jurors than the press or gallery
members.152 In fact, attorneys may find themselves in situations where conducting online research is a task that the duty of competence under Model
Rule 1.1 requires.153 In 2012, the ABA added a comment to the rule of competence that stated, “a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and
its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.”154 Therefore, it is clear that a total ban on online research of potential
jurors may interfere with an attorney’s duty to provide competent representation to her client. In some circumstances, an attorney may observe suspicious juror behavior and determine that her client’s case would best benefit
from further internet research. Due to the prevalence of technology in society, it is important that an attorney at least have the option to conduct internet
research to avoid engaging in ethical misconduct by not even considering
it.155

150. See United States v. Kilpatrick, No. 10-20403, 2012 WL 3237147, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 7, 2012); New York City Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2012-2 (2012).
151. Jonathan Redgrave & Jason Stover, The Info. Age, Part II: Juror Investigation on
the Internet – Implications for the Trial Lawyer, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 211, 214 (2001).
152. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
153. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). “A lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”
Id.
154. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012).
155. D.C. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 371 (2016).
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Nonetheless, internet and social media searches of potential jurors
should not be required due to the unpredictable nature of the online platforms.
Accordingly, it would be improper for a court to impose on the parties a
waiver of the right to obtain relief for juror misconduct, as seen in Johnson
and Burden CSX Transportation, Inc., in the absence of a pretrial internet
investigation of the potential jurors.156 The internet and social media were
not designed to be reliable, stable databases for litigation purposes, much like
Case.net in Missouri.157 In King v. Sorenson, the Missouri Court of Appeals
was forced to decide a case in which the waiver provision was implicated,
which consequently removed the litigant’s right to an impartial jury, because
the court gave the attorneys the wrong name for a potential juror.158 As a
result, the attorney’s mandatory search of Case.net failed to reveal information relating to the juror’s nondisclosure of his litigation history.159 As evidenced by King, even a database that was specifically designed to record the
court-related matter of litigation history was not functional or reliable enough
to carry the burden of storing information that could alter a litigant’s right to
an impartial jury. Thus, a database as unpredictable and ever-changing as
social media surely cannot withstand the burden of holding the key to an
individual’s constitutional rights.
Furthermore, people often go by completely unrecognizable aliases on
social media to prevent employers and other passersby from locating their
profiles.160 If internet and social media investigations were required to preserve the right to relief based upon juror misconduct, the complex and unsteady nature of social media would likely increase litigation by presenting
courts with novel reasons as to why a particular piece of public information
about a juror could not have been revealed through a simple internet search
of the name given to the attorneys by the court. A litigant’s constitutional
right to an impartial jury is far too precious to entrust to social media platforms, and a waiver of the opportunity to obtain relief based upon juror misconduct that results from the attorney’s failure to look on such platforms is
too harsh a result. Therefore, attorneys should enjoy the option of researching
potential jurors on social media, but litigants should not lose their right to an
impartial jury if attorneys fail to do so. As will be discussed later, courts
should impose on litigants a waiver of the right to obtain relief based upon
156. Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 559 (Mo. 2010); Burden v. CSX
Transp., Inc., No. 08-cv-04-DRH, 2011 WL 3793664, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2011).
157. Brief for Petitioner, King v. Sorenson, 532 S.W.3d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (No.
80196), 2017 WL 1374153, at *52.
158. King v. Sorenson, 532 S.W.3d 209, 212 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017).
159. Id.
160. See Facebook Changes Real-Name Policy, Allows Aliases, REUTERS LEGAL (OCT.
2, 2014, 07:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-drag-california/facebookchanges-real-name-policy-allows-aliases-idUSKCN0HR19220141002
[https://perma.cc/K82B-CB9U].
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juror misconduct only if the attorneys learned of juror nondisclosure through
their research but failed to disclose it to the court before the jury rendered a
verdict.
B. PROCEDURES THAT ATTORNEYS SHOULD FOLLOW WHEN CONDUCTING
RESEARCH

In the past, the United States Supreme Court honored and prioritized
juror privacy in a way that seems abandoned in the digital age.161 Nowadays,
attorneys can learn the most intimate information about jurors with just a
click of a button, and the impatient “need” for personal information has led
the system down a path that overlooks jurors’ rights when evaluating a litigant’s right to an impartial jury.162 Because of the critical role that juries play
in the outcome of court proceedings, it is of the utmost importance that the
pendulum swing back and start offering jurors more protections. When constructing guidelines for attorneys to follow when conducting internet and social media research of potential jurors, there are two important considerations: juror privacy and Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5(b). While
numerous bar associations have addressed how an attorney can remain in
compliance with Rule 3.5(b) while conducting internet and social media research,163 Judge William Alsup, in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., was
the first to consider the issue of juror privacy in this context.164 Thus, it is
appropriate to turn to both authorities for guidance as to how attorneys can
properly conduct internet and social media research of potential jurors.
To begin with, if attorneys intend to conduct searches of potential jurors,
the attorneys must reveal that intention to the jurors at the outset of the proceedings.165 The attorneys must tell the jurors what platforms may be
searched and cannot research any source beyond that of which the jurors have
been warned.166 After the attorneys have fully disclosed their intent and the
scope of their research, the jurors should be given sufficient time with their
electronics to alter the privacy settings on their social media accounts if they
wish to do so.167 By including jurors in the decision to research their online
presence and allowing them more control over their personal information,
courts put the jurors back in control and make them feel less like they are the
ones on trial. The court’s noticeable interest in the protection of juror privacy
161. See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749 (1929).
162. See Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 357 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
163. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 466 (2014); Colorado Bar
Ass’n, Formal Op. 127 (2015); D.C. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 371 (2016); New York City Bar
Ass’n, Formal Op. 2012-2 (2012); New York County Lawyer’s Ass’n, Formal Op. 743 (2011);
Pennsylvania Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014).
164. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
165. Id. at 1103.
166. Id. at 1104.
167. Id. at 1103.
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may provide the jurors with a sense of security and safety that encourages
and increases candor during voir dire.168 Because of the benefits to both the
court proceedings and to the morale of each individual juror, courts everywhere should share the “reverential respect” for juries that Judge Alsup expresses and demonstrates.169
In order to remain compliant with Model Rule of Professional Conduct
3.5(b), which prohibits attorneys from engaging in ex parte communications
with jurors, bar associations all agree that an attorney cannot send a juror a
“friend request” in order to view information that he intends to keep private
on his profile.170 However, a dispute arises when a social media platform automatically sends an account holder a notification when another user views
his profile, a practice which has been referred to as an “active search.” The
American Bar Association determined that an automated notification from a
website is not a communication because it is not sent by the attorney herself,171 but the New York City Bar Association concluded that the notification
is a search because the account holder still receives a communication and the
knowledge that the attorney viewed his profile.172 The explicit language of
Model Rule 3.5(b) does not require a certain mental state that attorneys must
possess in order to engage in prohibited communications with jurors.173 The
Rule’s language seems to prohibit all communications, and not only those
that the attorney intentionally creates.174 Communication is defined as “the
process of bringing an idea to another’s perception.”175 Even if an attorney
does not intend to send a message to a juror by viewing the juror’s profile,
the attorney is still causing an idea – that the juror is being researched – to be
brought to the juror’s attention.176 The sender of the notification is irrelevant
when the attorney is the one triggering the creation of the message in the first
place.177 Regardless, the juror is made aware that his online presence is being
monitored.
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court addressed a comparable
issue in Sinclair v. United States. In Sinclair, the defendants asserted the right
to have detectives conduct surveillance on jurors by shadowing them outside
168. See United States v. Bruno, 700 F. Supp. 2d 175, 182 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
169. Oracle America, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1101.
170. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 466 (2014); Colorado Bar
Ass’n, Formal Op. 127 (2015); D.C. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 371 (2016); New York City Bar
Ass’n, Formal Op. 2012-2 (2012); New York County Lawyer’s Ass’n, Formal Op. 743 (2011);
Pennsylvania Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014).
171. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 466 (2014).
172. New York City Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2012-2 (2012).
173. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.5(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
174. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.5(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); New York City
Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2012-2 (2012).
175. Communication, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
176. New York City Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2012-2 (2012).
177. Id.
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of the courthouse and reporting on their daily activities.178 The Court held
that the surveillance was impermissible because it was “enough to destroy
the equilibrium of the average juror and render impossible the exercise of
calm judgment upon patient consideration . . . they will either shun the burdens of the service or perform it with disquiet and disgust.”179 An “active
search” of a juror’s social media that results in the notification that the search
has taken place is analogous to the real-time surveillance over which the
Court previously expressed concern.180 In Sinclair, the jurors could potentially see in real-time when they were being followed and watched because
of the detective’s physical presence in the area, which the Court was afraid
would cause intimidation that would interfere with the jurors’ decision-making.181 Similarly, when a juror receives a notification at the exact moment the
attorney views his profile, he is aware in real-time that he is being watched
and may feel the same intimidation that interferes with “the exercise of calm
judgment upon patient consideration.”182 A juror’s hyperawareness of not
only the fact that he is being watched, but the exact moment that it is occurring, can significantly harm the juror’s willingness to perform his duties
while serving on the jury. Therefore, attorneys should avoid conducting any
research that cannot be done without alerting the juror.
Furthermore, at the time the various bar associations debated the issue
of automated notifications, they only considered the notifications that resulted from viewing an individual’s LinkedIn account.183 However, the rapid
advances in technology have expanded this issue in more ways than previously imaginable. Today, individuals can participate in “live” social media,
which includes live streaming videos and posting “stories” for twenty-four
hours at a time.184 When social media users post “live” materials, the users
can view who has clicked on and watched the post.185 In order to see an individual’s social media “stories” on both Facebook and Instagram, all the person who wishes to watch must do is tap the user’s profile picture at the top
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of the screen.186 The social media platforms keep track of who clicks on the
profile picture and reports the names back to the user, similar to the LinkedIn
automated notifications. As a result of the complexity of “live” social media,
attorneys who decide to engage in social media research of jurors have a
heightened duty of competence. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 requires that a lawyer “provide competent representation to a client,” which
“requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”187 A comment to the Rule states that “a
lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including
the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.”188 In order to
comply with this ethical rule, attorneys who conduct social media research
need to maintain intimate familiarity with the platforms and their notification
settings in order to avoid engaging in improper communications by causing
jurors to receive notifications that the attorneys are monitoring their online
presence.
Once attorneys begin their research, they must document every search
they make and copy all information they view.189 By keeping exact records
of the research, attorneys will already possess the materials needed in the
case of a subsequent motion for relief based upon juror misconduct or nondisclosure.190 The court and the attorneys may both review the records to ensure that neither party withheld troublesome information prior to the verdict
in order to obtain a benefit for their clients.
While the waiver of a litigant’s right to an impartial jury would be an
improper consequence for an attorney who bypassed internet or social media
research of a potential juror, a waiver of that right based on juror misconduct
or nondisclosure is proper if an attorney’s research revealed suspicious information and the information was withheld from the court and opposing party.
If, in the course of research, potential misconduct is discovered, the attorney
must immediately reveal the information to the court and opposing party,
even if the information is beneficial to her case.191 Imposing an absolute duty
to reveal any potential misconduct eliminates the interpretive issue that the
American Bar Association (ABA) encountered with Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3.192 Rule 3.3 requires that a lawyer “who knows that a per-
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son . . . has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”193 The ABA contemplated what an attorney should do
if her affirmative duty to report is not triggered by the information she discovers because it falls short of criminal or fraudulent behavior but is nonetheless problematic because it violates court procedures or instructions.194
This scenario invites the temptation for attorneys to withhold information as
a matter of strategy if the information benefits their client or their case. An
Illinois court in Burden v. CSX Transportation, Inc. addressed the issue of
attorneys “gambl[ing] with the possibility of a verdict and thereafter, when
the verdict proves unfavorable, raise a question he might have raised before
verdict.”195 The court in Burden treated the withholding of information until
after an unfavorable verdict as a waiver of the right to later challenge the jury
if the information was known by the party or the attorney before the verdict.196
The United States Supreme Court took a similar position in McDonough
Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood.197 In McDonough Power Equipment,
the Court struggled with the question of whether the attorneys knew during
voir dire that the juror was withholding information.198 The Court held that
if the attorneys knew during voir dire that a juror was withholding information, the party who possessed the information and failed to reveal it or
inquire further “would be barred from later challenging the composition of
the jury.”199 Requiring immediate disclosure of the information that attorneys
discover during internet and social media research of potential jurors, and
waiver of the right to challenge the jury in the absence of disclosure, is consistent with the Supreme Court’s attempt to prevent attorneys from suppressing information that suggests juror misconduct in order to obtain an advantage in their cases. It would be improper and inefficient to allow attorneys
to frustrate and surprise courts by pulling out “gotcha cards” in the event of
an unfavorable verdict.200 Therefore, it is appropriate for courts to impose a
waiver of the right to an impartial jury on parties who possess information
suggesting juror misconduct or nondisclosure, but fail to disclose that information to the court and opposing party before the jury renders a verdict.
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C. WHAT CAN ATTORNEYS DO WITH THE INFORMATION?

While attorneys should be permitted to conduct internet and social media research of potential jurors while following the above procedures, courts
should place restrictions on how attorneys may use that information during
voir dire and trial. According to a 2016 survey of 100 jury-eligible adults,
potential jurors usually expect that attorneys will conduct some sort of background investigation on them and are not overly concerned by that fact.201
The primary concern that potential jurors have with attorneys conducting
online research is, instead, what the attorneys choose to do with that information inside the courtroom.202 The survey found that only 20% of participants thought that it was appropriate for attorneys to ask specific follow-up
questions in front of the other members of the jury, while 62% felt that specific follow-up questions were appropriate if asked outside the presence of
the other members of the jury.203 If attorneys expose personal information
about potential jurors to everyone sitting in the courtroom, they run the risk
of biasing the targeted juror against their client’s case. If a juror feels
wronged from the very beginning and is chosen to sit on the jury, that juror
may carry his bias against the attorney into deliberations and taint the entire
jury. Jurors should remain focused on the facts and law of each case, and
public disclosure of their most intimate opinions and experiences may shift
their focus into a personal vendetta against an attorney. Therefore, an attorney should only inquire into specific details found on a juror’s social media
in private to avoid damaging her client’s case.
In addition to avoiding specific follow-up questions about a juror’s
online presence during voir dire, attorneys should also avoid exploiting the
information they learn online to make improper personal or emotional appeals to an individual juror during arguments and witness questioning
throughout trial. As Judge Alsup stated in Oracle, a “calculated personal appeal” by an attorney “in an effort to ingratiate himself or herself into the
heartstrings of that juror” is “out of bounds.”204 A jury’s role is to decide a
case based solely on the evidence before it, and an argument or line of questioning that is designed to invite a juror to render a verdict based on an a
emotional appeal is improper.205 In fact, the Federal Rules of Evidence even
permit a court to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed”206 by the danger of unfair prejudice, which has been com-
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monly interpreted to mean “inducing a decision on a purely emotional basis.”207 Courts and rulemakers alike have taken affirmative steps to prevent
attorneys from presenting information that would cause the jury to violate its
duty to consider only the facts and the law of the case, and instead consider
emotional and personal opinions. Exploiting specific personal information
about jurors during trial proceedings for the benefit of one’s case is nothing
more than another version of introducing evidence that induces a decision
based upon impermissible considerations. An example that Judge Alsup offered in Oracle was if an attorney in a copyright proceeding learned from
social media that a juror’s favorite book was How to Kill a Mockingbird, the
attorney could form connections between the copyright case at bar and the
recent death of the author of the book, Harper Lee, to invite the juror to feel
emotionally invested in the outcome of the case.208 The emotional connection
that the juror would feel may interfere with his ability to see the case he is
sitting for through an objective lens, and instead consider how he would feel
if there were a copyright infringement against his favorite late author. Therefore, attorneys should only be able to use the information they gather during
internet and social media research to excuse jurors, and not to construct arguments that individual jurors will appreciate based upon their personal preferences.
IV. CONCLUSION
Modern technology has proven to be incredibly helpful for attorneys in
litigation preparation, but courts have demonstrated difficulty in keeping up
with its rapid advances. Attorneys have unprecedented access to the personal
lives, opinions, and experiences of potential jurors with just one click on social media, which is easily conducted outside the presence and supervision
of the court. Courts and ethics opinions that have made attempts to address
the issue have left important gaps in analyses and rules. This Comment offers
a model rule for courts to consider and attorneys to follow, while taking the
limited existing authority into consideration. This Comment suggests that internet and social media research should be permitted by courts but should not
be required or result in a waiver of the right to obtain relief based upon juror
misconduct if the attorney fails to conduct research. Attorneys should be required to follow specific guidelines before, during, and after the research in
an effort to honor juror privacy and ethical rules. Once attorneys gather information from the internet and social media, they should only be allowed to
use that information to excuse jurors and avoid using it to make personal
appeals to individual jurors.

207.
208.

FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.
Oracle Am., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1103.

